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CRYPTSETUP(8) Maintenance Commands CRYPTSETUP(8)
cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt, LUKS, and other encrypted
volumes
cryptsetup <action> [<options>] <action args>
cryptsetup is used to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed
device-mapper mappings. These include plain dm-crypt volumes and
LUKS volumes. The difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header
and can hence offer more features than plain dm-crypt. On the
other hand, the header is visible and vulnerable to damage.
In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of
loop-AES volumes, TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt, BitLocker and FileVault2
compatible volumes, and for hardware-based encryption on OPAL
capable drives.
For more information about specific cryptsetup action see
cryptsetup-<action>(8), where <action> is the name of the
cryptsetup action.
The following are valid actions for all supported device types.
OPEN
open <device> <name> --type <device_type>
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
CLOSE
close <name>
Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel
memory.
See cryptsetup-close(8).
STATUS
status <name>
Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-status(8).
RESIZE
resize <name>
Resizes an active mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-resize(8).
REFRESH
refresh <name>
Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-refresh(8).
REENCRYPT
reencrypt <device> or --active-name <name> [<new_name>]
Run LUKS device reencryption.
See cryptsetup-reencrypt(8).
Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a
single, non-salted hash of the passphrase. No checks are
performed, no metadata is used. There is no formatting operation.
When the raw device is mapped (opened), the usual device
operations can be used on the mapped device, including filesystem
creation. Mapped devices usually reside in /dev/mapper/<name>.
The following are valid plain device type actions:
OPEN
open --type plain <device> <name>
create <name> <device> (OBSOLETE syntax)
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
LUKS, the Linux Unified Key Setup, is a standard for disk
encryption. It adds a standardized header at the start of the
device, a key-slot area directly behind the header and the bulk
data area behind that. The whole set is called a 'LUKS
container'. The device that a LUKS container resides on is called
a 'LUKS device'. For most purposes, both terms can be used
interchangeably. But note that when the LUKS header is at a
nonzero offset in a device, then the device is not a LUKS device
anymore, but has a LUKS container stored in it at an offset.
LUKS can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually
revoked or changed and that can be securely scrubbed from
persistent media due to the use of anti-forensic stripes.
Passphrases are protected against brute-force and dictionary
attacks by Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF).
LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional
extensions like different PBKDF algorithm or authenticated
encryption. You can format device with LUKS2 header if you
specify --type luks2 in luksFormat command. For activation, the
format is already recognized automatically.
Each passphrase, also called a key in this document, is
associated with one of 8 key-slots. Key operations that do not
specify a slot affect the first slot that matches the supplied
passphrase or the first empty slot if a new passphrase is added.
The <device> parameter can also be specified by a LUKS UUID in
the format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to real device name uses
symlinks in /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.
To specify a detached header, the --header parameter can be used
in all LUKS commands and always takes precedence over the
positional <device> parameter.
The following are valid LUKS actions:
FORMAT
luksFormat <device> [<key file>]
Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase (for
key-slot 0).
See cryptsetup-luksFormat(8).
OPEN
open --type luks <device> <name>
luksOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after
successful verification of the supplied passphrase.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
SUSPEND
luksSuspend <name>
Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and
accesses to the device will wait indefinitely) and wipes the
encryption key from kernel memory.
See cryptsetup-luksSuspend(8).
RESUME
luksResume <name>
Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key.
See cryptsetup-luksResume(8).
ADD KEY
luksAddKey <device> [<key file with new key>]
Adds a new passphrase using an existing passphrase.
See cryptsetup-luksAddKey(8).
REMOVE KEY
luksRemoveKey <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]
Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device.
See cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey(8).
CHANGE KEY
luksChangeKey <device> [<new key file>]
Changes an existing passphrase.
See cryptsetup-luksChangeKey(8).
CONVERT KEY
luksConvertKey <device>
Converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new PBKDF parameters.
See cryptsetup-luksConvertKey(8).
KILL SLOT
luksKillSlot <device> <key slot number>
Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device.
See cryptsetup-luksKillSlot(8).
ERASE
erase <device>
luksErase <device> (old syntax)
Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently
inaccessible.
See cryptsetup-erase(8).
UUID
luksUUID <device>
Print or set the UUID of a LUKS device.
See cryptsetup-luksUUID(8).
IS LUKS
isLuks <device>
Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise.
See cryptsetup-isLuks(8).
DUMP
luksDump <device>
Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
See cryptsetup-luksDump(8).
HEADER BACKUP
luksHeaderBackup <device> --header-backup-file <file>
Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
See cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup(8).
HEADER RESTORE
luksHeaderRestore <device> --header-backup-file <file>
Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area from
the specified file.
See cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore(8).
TOKEN
token <add|remove|import|export> <device>
Manipulate token objects used for obtaining passphrases.
See cryptsetup-token(8).
CONVERT
convert <device> --type <format>
Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible).
See cryptsetup-convert(8).
CONFIG
config <device>
Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header).
See cryptsetup-config(8).
cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using a
compatibility mode.
OPEN
open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>
loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile> (old syntax)
Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
See also section 7 of the FAQ and loop-AES
<http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net> for more information regarding
loop-AES.
cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt
encrypted partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header
formatting and TCRYPT header change is not supported, cryptsetup
never changes TCRYPT header on-device.
TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38). If you are
configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface for
symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
(CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
Because TCRYPT header is encrypted, you have to always provide
valid passphrase and keyfiles.
Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy
cipher chains using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption
block (namely Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is
limitation of kernel crypto API).
VeraCrypt is extension of TrueCrypt header with increased
iteration count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time.
To open a VeraCrypt device with a custom Personal Iteration
Multiplier (PIM) value, use either the --veracrypt-pim=<PIM>
option to directly specify the PIM on the command- line or use
--veracrypt-query-pim to be prompted for the PIM.
The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key
derivation. Please refer to PIM
<https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20%28PIM%29.html>
for more detailed information.
If you need to disable VeraCrypt device support, use
--disable-veracrypt option.
NOTE: Activation with tcryptOpen is supported only for cipher
chains using LRW or XTS encryption modes.
The tcryptDump command should work for all recognized TCRYPT
devices and doesn’t require superuser privilege.
To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole
encrypted system resides) use --tcrypt-system option. You can use
partition device as the parameter (parameter must be real
partition device, not an image in a file), then only this
partition is mapped.
If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want
to map multiple partition encrypted with system encryption,
please create loopback mapping with partitions first (losetup -P,
see losetup(8) man page for more info), and use loop partition as
the device parameter.
If you use the whole base device as a parameter, one device for
the whole system encryption is mapped. This mode is available
only for backward compatibility with older cryptsetup versions
which mapped TCRYPT system encryption using the whole device.
To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use
--tcrypt-hidden option.
To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use --tcrypt-backup
option.
NOTE: There is no protection for a hidden volume if the outer
volume is mounted. The reason is that if there were any
protection, it would require some metadata describing what to
protect in the outer volume and the hidden volume would become
detectable.
OPEN
open --type tcrypt <device> <name>
tcryptOpen_ <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a
mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
DUMP
tcryptDump <device>
Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.
See cryptsetup-tcryptDump(8).
See also TrueCrypt <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt> and
VeraCrypt <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt> pages for
more information.
Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt
code, please report all problems related to this compatibility
extension to the cryptsetup project.
cryptsetup supports mapping of BitLocker and BitLocker to Go
encrypted partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header
formatting and BITLK header changes are not supported, cryptsetup
never changes BITLK header on-device.
BITLK extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
available (for details see TCRYPT section).
Cryptsetup should recognize all BITLK header variants, except
legacy header used in Windows Vista systems and partially
decrypted BitLocker devices. Activation of legacy devices
encrypted in CBC mode requires at least Linux kernel version 5.3
and for devices using Elephant diffuser kernel 5.6.
The bitlkDump command should work for all recognized BITLK
devices and doesn’t require superuser privilege.
For unlocking with the open a password or a recovery passphrase
or a startup key must be provided.
Additionally unlocking using volume key is supported. You must
provide BitLocker Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK) using the
--volume-key-file option. The key must be decrypted and without
the header (only 128/256/512 bits of key data depending on used
cipher and mode).
Other unlocking methods (TPM, SmartCard) are not supported.
OPEN
open --type bitlk <device> <name>
bitlkOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the BITLK (a BitLocker-compatible) <device> and sets up a
mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
DUMP
bitlkDump <device>
Dump the header information of a BITLK device.
See cryptsetup-bitlkDump(8).
Please note that cryptsetup does not use any Windows BitLocker
code, please report all problems related to this compatibility
extension to the cryptsetup project.
cryptsetup supports the mapping of FileVault2 (FileVault2
full-disk encryption) by Apple for the macOS operating system
using a native Linux kernel API.
NOTE: cryptsetup supports only FileVault2 based on Core Storage
and HFS+ filesystem (introduced in MacOS X 10.7 Lion). It does
NOT support the new version of FileVault based on the APFS
filesystem used in recent macOS versions.
Header formatting and FVAULT2 header changes are not supported;
cryptsetup never changes the FVAULT2 header on-device.
FVAULT2 extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
available (for details, see TCRYPT section) and kernel driver for
HFS+ (hfsplus) filesystem.
Cryptsetup should recognize the basic configuration for portable
drives.
The fvault2Dump command should work for all recognized FVAULT2
devices and doesn’t require superuser privilege.
For unlocking with the open, a password must be provided. Other
unlocking methods are not supported.
OPEN
open --type fvault2 <device> <name>
fvault2Open <device> <name> (old syntax)
Opens the FVAULT2 (a FileVault2-compatible) <device> (usually the
second partition on the device) and sets up a mapping <name>.
See cryptsetup-open(8).
cryptsetup supports using native hardware encryption on drives
that provide an OPAL interface, both nested with dm-crypt and
standalone. Passphrases, tokens and metadata are stored using the
LUKS2 header format, and are thus compatible with any software or
system that uses LUKS2 (e.g.: tokens).
WARNING: this support is new and experimental, and requires at
least kernel v6.4. Resizing devices is not supported.
--hw-opal can be specified for OPAL + dm-crypt, and
--hw-opal-only can be specified to use OPAL only, without a
dm-crypt layer.
Opening, closing and enrolling tokens work in the same way as
with LUKS2 and dm-crypt. The new parameters are only necessary
when formatting, the LUKS2 metadata will ensure the right setup
is performed when opening or closing. If no subsystem is
specified, it will be automatically set to HW-OPAL so that it is
immediately apparent when a device uses OPAL.
FORMAT
luksFormat --type luks2 --hw-opal <device> [<key file>]
Additionally specify --hw-opal-only instead of --hw-opal to avoid
the dm-crypt layer. Other than the usual passphrase, an admin
password will have to be specified when formatting the first
partition of the drive, and will have to be re-supplied when
formatting any other partition until a factory reset is
performed.
ERASE
erase <device>
Securely erase a partition or device. Requires admin password.
Additionally specify --hw-opal-factory-reset for a FULL factory
reset of the drive, using the drive’s PSID (typically printed on
the label) instead of the admin password. WARNING: a factory
reset will cause ALL data on the device to be lost, regardless of
the partition it is ran on, if any, and regardless of any LUKS2
header backup.
REPAIR
repair <device>
Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently
supported only for LUKS device type.
See cryptsetup-repair(8).
BENCHMARK
benchmark <options>
Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function).
See cryptsetup-benchmark(8).
Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use
LUKS. With plain dm-crypt there are a number of possible user
errors that massively decrease security. While LUKS cannot fix
them all, it can lessen the impact for many of them.
A lot of good information on the risks of using encrypted
storage, on handling problems and on security aspects can be
found in the Cryptsetup FAQ. Read it. Nonetheless, some risks
deserve to be mentioned here.
Backup: Storage media die. Encryption has no influence on that.
Backup is mandatory for encrypted data as well, if the data has
any worth. See the Cryptsetup FAQ for advice on how to do a
backup of an encrypted volume.
Character encoding: If you enter a passphrase with special
symbols, the passphrase can change depending on character
encoding. Keyboard settings can also change, which can make blind
input hard or impossible. For example, switching from some ASCII
8-bit variant to UTF-8 can lead to a different binary encoding
and hence different passphrase seen by cryptsetup, even if what
you see on the terminal is exactly the same. It is therefore
highly recommended to select passphrase characters only from
7-bit ASCII, as the encoding for 7-bit ASCII stays the same for
all ASCII variants and UTF-8.
LUKS header: If the header of a LUKS volume gets damaged, all
data is permanently lost unless you have a header-backup. If a
key-slot is damaged, it can only be restored from a header-backup
or if another active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged.
Damaging the LUKS header is something people manage to do with
surprising frequency. This risk is the result of a trade-off
between security and safety, as LUKS is designed for fast and
secure wiping by just overwriting header and key-slot area.
Previously used partitions: If a partition was previously used,
it is a very good idea to wipe filesystem signatures, data, etc.
before creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it. For a
quick removal of filesystem signatures, use wipefs(8). Take care
though that this may not remove everything. In particular, MD
RAID signatures at the end of a device may survive. It also does
not remove data. For a full wipe, overwrite the whole partition
before container creation. If you do not know how to do that, the
cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.
Example 1: Create LUKS 2 container on block device /dev/sdX.
sudo cryptsetup --type luks2 luksFormat /dev/sdX
Example 2: Add an additional passphrase to key slot 5.
sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 5 /dev/sdX
Example 3: Create LUKS header backup and save it to file.
sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/sdX
--header-backup-file /var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile
Example 4: Open LUKS container on /dev/sdX and map it to
sdX_crypt.
sudo cryptsetup open /dev/sdX sdX_crypt
WARNING: The command in example 5 will erase all key slots.
Your cannot use your LUKS container afterward anymore unless
you have a backup to restore.
Example 5: Erase all key slots on /dev/sdX.
sudo cryptsetup erase /dev/sdX
Example 6: Restore LUKS header from backup file.
sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderRestore /dev/sdX
--header-backup-file /var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile
Cryptsetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission (bad
passphrase), 3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device
already exists or device is busy.
Passphrase processing for PLAIN mode
Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode.
If hashing is done, it is a single direct hash. This means that
low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.
From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline,
i.e. '\n'. The input without the newline character is processed
with the default hash or the hash specified with --hash. The hash
result will be truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or
the size specified with -s.
From stdin: Reading will continue until a newline (or until the
maximum input size is reached), with the trailing newline
stripped. The maximum input size is defined by the same
compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can be
overwritten using --keyfile-size option.
The data read will be hashed with the default hash or the hash
specified with --hash. The hash result will be truncated to the
key size of the used cipher, or the size specified with -s.
Note that if --key-file=- is used for reading the key from stdin,
trailing newlines are not stripped from the input.
If "plain" is used as argument to --hash, the input data will not
be hashed. Instead, it will be zero padded (if shorter than the
key size) or truncated (if longer than the key size) and used
directly as the binary key. This is useful for directly
specifying a binary key. No warning will be given if the amount
of data read from stdin is less than the key size.
From a key file: It will be truncated to the key size of the used
cipher or the size given by -s and directly used as a binary key.
WARNING: The --hash argument is being ignored. The --hash option
is usable only for stdin input in plain mode.
If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup will quit
with an error. The maximum input size is defined by the same
compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can be
overwritten using --keyfile-size option.
Passphrase processing for LUKS
LUKS uses PBKDF to protect against dictionary attacks and to give
some protection to low-entropy passphrases (see cryptsetup FAQ).
From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline
and then processed by PBKDF2 without the newline character.
From stdin: LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the first
newline character or the compiled-in maximum key file length. If
--keyfile-size is given, it is ignored.
From key file: The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in
maximum size. Newline characters do not terminate the input. The
--keyfile-size option can be used to limit what is read.
Passphrase processing: Whenever a passphrase is added to a LUKS
header (luksAddKey, luksFormat), the user may specify how much
the time the passphrase processing should consume. The time is
used to determine the iteration count for PBKDF2 and higher times
will offer better protection for low-entropy passphrases, but
open will take longer to complete. For passphrases that have
entropy higher than the used key length, higher iteration times
will not increase security.
The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most
practical cases. The only exception is a low-entropy passphrase
used on a device with a slow CPU, as this will result in a low
iteration count. On a slow device, it may be advisable to
increase the iteration time using the --iter-time option in order
to obtain a higher iteration count. This does slow down all later
luksOpen operations accordingly.
Incoherent behavior for invalid passphrases/keys
LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition is
unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-crypt is different. It will
always decrypt with the passphrase given. If the given passphrase
is wrong, the device mapped by plain dm-crypt will essentially
still contain encrypted data and will be unreadable.
Supported ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
The available combinations of ciphers, modes, hashes and key
sizes depend on kernel support. See /proc/crypto for a list of
available options. You might need to load additional kernel
crypto modules in order to get more options.
For the --hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt, then
all algorithms supported by the gcrypt library are available. For
other crypto backends, some algorithms may be missing.
Notes on passphrases
Mathematics can’t be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases
safe. There are a few nice tricks for constructing a fallback,
when suddenly out of the blue, your brain refuses to cooperate.
These fallbacks need LUKS, as it’s only possible with LUKS to
have multiple passphrases. Still, if your attacker model does not
prevent it, storing your passphrase in a sealed envelope
somewhere may be a good idea as well.
Notes on Random Number Generators
Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the
kernel RNGs without any modifications or additions to data stream
produced.
There are two types of randomness cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type
(which always uses /dev/urandom) is used for salts, the AF
splitter and for wiping deleted keyslots.
The second type is used for the volume key. You can switch
between using /dev/random and /dev/urandom here, see --use-random
and --use-urandom options. Using /dev/random on a system without
enough entropy sources can cause luksFormat to block until the
requested amount of random data is gathered. In a low-entropy
situation (embedded system), this can take a very long time and
potentially forever. At the same time, using /dev/urandom in a
low-entropy situation will produce low-quality keys. This is a
serious problem, but solving it is out of scope for a mere
man-page. See urandom(4) for more information.
Authenticated disk encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated
disk encryption.
Normal disk encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext
sector is of the same size as a ciphertext sector) and can
provide only confidentiality protection, but not
cryptographically sound data integrity protection.
Authenticated modes require additional space per-sector for
authentication tag and use Authenticated Encryption with
Additional Data (AEAD) algorithms.
If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection,
there will be an underlying dm-integrity device, which provides
additional per-sector metadata space and also provide data
journal protection to ensure atomicity of data and metadata
update. Because there must be additional space for metadata and
journal, the available space for the device will be smaller than
for length-preserving modes.
The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity
device. All activation and deactivation of this device stack is
performed by cryptsetup, there is no difference in using luksOpen
for integrity protected devices. If you want to format LUKS2
device with data integrity protection, use --integrity option
(see cryptsetup-luksFormat(8)).
Albeit Linux kernel 5.7 added TRIM support for standalone
dm-integrity devices, cryptsetup(8) can’t offer support for
discards (TRIM) in authenticated encryption mode, because the
underlying dm-crypt kernel module does not support this
functionality when dm-integrity is used as auth tag space
allocator (see --allow-discards in cryptsetup-luksFormat(8)).
Some integrity modes requires two independent keys (key for
encryption and for authentication). Both these keys are stored in
one LUKS keyslot.
WARNING: All support for authenticated modes is experimental and
there are only some modes available for now. Note that there are
a very few authenticated encryption algorithms that are suitable
for disk encryption. You also cannot use CRC32 or any other
non-cryptographic checksums (other than the special integrity
mode "none"). If for some reason you want to have integrity
control without using authentication mode, then you should
separately configure dm-integrity independently of LUKS2.
Notes on loopback device use
Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device (disk
partition or LVM volume). However, if the device argument is a
file, cryptsetup tries to allocate a loopback device and map it
into this file. This mode requires Linux kernel 2.6.25 or more
recent which supports the loop autoclear flag (loop device is
cleared on the last close automatically). Of course, you can
always map a file to a loop-device manually. See the cryptsetup
FAQ for an example.
When device mapping is active, you can see the loop backing file
in the status command output. Also see losetup(8).
LUKS2 header locking
The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in several steps and to
achieve proper atomic update, there is a locking mechanism. For
an image in file, code uses flock(2) system call. For a block
device, lock is performed over a special file stored in a locking
directory (by default /run/cryptsetup). The locking directory
should be created with the proper security context by the
distribution during the boot-up phase. Only LUKS2 uses locks,
other formats do not use this mechanism.
LUKS on-disk format specification
For LUKS on-disk metadata specification see LUKS1
<https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification>
and LUKS2 <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs>.
Cryptsetup is originally written by Jana Saout <[email protected]>.
The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by Clemens
Fruhwirth <[email protected]>.
Man page extensions by Milan Broz <[email protected]>.
Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <[email protected]>.
Report bugs at cryptsetup mailing list
<[email protected]> or in Issues project section
<https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/issues/new>.
Please attach output of the failed command with --debug option
added.
Cryptsetup FAQ
<https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions>
cryptsetup(8), integritysetup(8) and veritysetup(8)
Part of cryptsetup project
<https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/>. This page is part of
the Cryptsetup ((open-source disk encryption)) project.
Information about the project can be found at
⟨https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup⟩. If you have a bug
report for this manual page, send it to [email protected]. This
page was obtained from the project's upstream Git repository
⟨https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git⟩ on 2024-06-14. (At
that time, the date of the most recent commit that was found in
the repository was 2024-06-11.) If you discover any rendering
problems in this HTML version of the page, or you believe there
is a better or more up-to-date source for the page, or you have
corrections or improvements to the information in this COLOPHON
(which is not part of the original manual page), send a mail to
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cryptsetup 2.8.0-git 2023-12-22 CRYPTSETUP(8)
Pages that refer to this page: homectl(1), systemd-cryptenroll(1), crypttab(5), cryptsetup(8), cryptsetup-benchmark(8), cryptsetup-bitlkDump(8), cryptsetup-close(8), cryptsetup-config(8), cryptsetup-convert(8), cryptsetup-erase(8), cryptsetup-fvault2Dump(8), cryptsetup-isLuks(8), cryptsetup-luksAddKey(8), cryptsetup-luksChangeKey(8), cryptsetup-luksConvertKey(8), cryptsetup-luksDump(8), cryptsetup-luksFormat(8), cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup(8), cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore(8), cryptsetup-luksKillSlot(8), cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey(8), cryptsetup-luksResume(8), cryptsetup-luksSuspend(8), cryptsetup-luksUUID(8), cryptsetup-open(8), cryptsetup-reencrypt(8), cryptsetup-refresh(8), cryptsetup-repair(8), cryptsetup-resize(8), cryptsetup-ssh(8), cryptsetup-status(8), cryptsetup-tcryptDump(8), cryptsetup-token(8), fsadm(8), integritysetup(8), losetup(8), systemd-cryptsetup(8), systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8), systemd-gpt-auto-generator(8), [email protected](8), veritysetup(8)
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